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The Financial Flows of the Transnational Crime: 








1.   Introduction 
Until 2008, the growth of the world economy was quite strong and improved the economic 
well-being all over the globe, but this development was also accompanied by some risks. One 
of them is transnational crime, which has shown a remarkable increase in the last 20 years
3. 
This raises the following two questions: (1) How is transnational crime financed, and what do 
we know about this financing? (2) What economic implications does transnational crime 
have? In this contribution question (2) will be very briefly answered, however the main focus 
lies on providing a more detailed answer on the financing of transnational crime (question 1). 
Additionally a detailed analysis of the finances of transnational crime is crucial to reduce their 
financial options, so that the basis of their operations is at least limited. Such an analysis is 
another goal of this chapter.  
My paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a literature review on the kinds 
of transnational crime financing. Section 3 shows the infiltration of transnational crime into 
the economic system. In section 4 some conclusions and policy recommendations are drawn. 
 
 
2.  The Kinds of Transnational Crime Financing: A Preliminary 
Literature Review 
My literature review will meet two objectives: to widen the knowledge of this subject and the 
understanding of the main issues under debate and to focus on the literature closely related to 
the research topic. The body of literature on transnational crime financing is diverse and quite 
often merely descriptive; hence within this chapter, only the important contributions are 
summarized. This literature review can not be separated from the analysis of the finances of 
terrorist organizations, because transnational crime organizations and terrorist groups often 
work closely together
4. Hence we start with common aspects and then with differences of 
both types of organizations. 
 
2.1  Some Common Aspects of Transnational Crime and Terrorist Groups Financing 
Similarities between transnational crime and terrorist groups are fully described by Schneider 
(2008a, 2008b, 2009), Schneider, Brueck and Meierrieks (2010), Sanderson (2004); Gilmore 
(2004), Shelley (2005); Wilkinson (2005); Makarenko (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c) and Koh 
(2006); these groups have the following similarities:  
(1) both are highly rational actors, e.g. they know quite well what they are doing; 
                                                 
1 The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework 
Programme under grant agreement n°218105 (EUSECON). 
2 Prof. Dr. Dr.h.c.mult. Friedrich Schneider, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University, 
Altenbergerstr. 69, A-4040 Linz, Austria, Phone: +43 (0)732 2468-8210, Fax: +43 (0)732 2468-8902, E-mail: 
friedrich.schneider@jku.at, http://www.econ.jku.at/schneider. 
3 See for an example Walker and Unger (2009). 
4 Compare Schneider (2008a, 2008b, 2009), Makarenko (2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c), Koh (2006) and 
Masciandaro (2004). Page 2 of 16 
(2) both use extreme violence and the threat of reprisals, in order to reach their goals; 
(3) both operate secretly, though at times publicly in friendly territory, and  
(4) both defy the state and the rule of law. 
According to Masciandaro (2004, 2005, 2006), Picarelli (2006), Shelley (2005) and Yepes 
(2008) the issues of transnational crime, money laundering, and the financing of terrorism 
have the following common aspects: 
(1) Transnational crime and terror organizations use wire transfers or electronic payment 
systems to move money through multiple jurisdictions. 
(2) Both engage in a variety of criminal activities in a similar way to traffickers and other 
criminal syndicates. However, the line is now becoming less defined, since terrorists often 
resort to crime and cooperate with criminals in generating money, obtaining arms and 
explosives. According to Makarenko (2003a, 2003b) criminals are likely to use terrorism 
tactics and violence in pursuit of revenues: 
(i)  Drug, arms and human trafficking
5, trading in precious stones (diamonds) and 
other commodities,  
(ii) smuggled cash, cigarettes, and other addicted goods, and 
(iii)criminal activities like kidnapping.
6 
Both groups benefit from shell companies and offshore bank facilities. For instance, money 
laundering experts
7, argue that both groups use a technique known as a “starburst”: A deposit 
of dirty money is made in a bank with standing instructions to wire it in small, random 
fragments to hundreds of other bank accounts around the world, in all types of financial  
centre. Tracking down the money becomes very difficult, since obtaining legal permission to 
pursue bank accounts in multiple jurisdictions can take years. Napoleoni (2005, p.33) argues, 
“You build a long chain of representative offices at the end of which there is a shell company 
registered offshore, and you are lucky, if you get to the end of the chain. Financial 
investigations often run into a blind alley always through, somewhere, in a tiny offshore 
office”. From this Napoleoni (2005) concludes that it is extremely difficult to track down 
crime money. 
 
2.2  The Main Differences in Financing between Transnational Crime and Terrorist 
Groups  
There are also differences between transnational crime and terrorist groups with respect to 
financing. To some extent it is possible to make a distinction in the roots and operational 
characteristics: 
(1)  Terrorist Financing
8 
A number of scholars (Napoleoni (2005), Krueger (2008), Yepes (2008)) explain 
terrorism through religion, development of socio-political causes, and sometimes the 
state of the economy. They argue that typical operational characteristics of terrorist 
groups are:  
                                                 
5 Makarenko (2003a), p. 66 writes:”The most common criminal activity terrorist groups have been involved in is 
the illicit drug trade. Since the 1970s groups such as FARC, Basque  Fatherland and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta 
Askatasuna – ETA), the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan – PKK) and Sendero Luminoso 
have all been linked to the drug trade by well-documented evidence. Since the early 1990s additional groups 
such as Hizbullah and the IMU have also realised the finacial utility of participating in the illicit drugs trade. It is 
alleged that Hizbullah continues to protect heroin and cocaine laboratories in the Bekaa Valley; and evidence 
strongly indicated that the IMZ – prior to the Afghan campaign – controlled drug trafficking routes into Central 
Asia from northern Afghanistan”. 
6 Similar arguments are brought forward by Gilmore (2004), Giraldo and Trinkunas (2007), Hutchinson and 
Malley (2007), and Koh (2006). 
7 See: Koh (2006), Schneider (2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) and Masciandaro (2004). 
8 In this section the only goal is to show that there are major differences between terrorist financing and 
transnational crime. Page 3 of 16 
(i)  Low costs / low technology structures of the type that made possible some recent 
attacks with a great impact on human lives, on nations, and on economies (e.g. 
9/11 New York, Madrid, London and Mumbai). 
(ii) Flexible and decentralized organizations with independent decisions and actions. 
(iii)Common ideology with indiscriminate targets (i.e. no purpose that can be related 
to profit). 
(iv)  Financial means are needed to plan and execute (future) terrorist attacks; there is 
only a limited need to hide assets. 
(v) Self-financing with possible criminal activities but also obtaining money from 
legal sources (e.g., donations and charity organizations). Terrorists use different 
sources of money, depending on their motivations, their mode of operations, and 
the resistance they face from law enforcement. Quite often the money starts off 
clean, becoming “dirty” only when the terrorist crime is committed at some point 
in the future. Hence, terrorist “enterprises” use clean money to commit crimes 
 
(2)   Transnational Crime Turnover and Money Laundering
9 
Criminal or dirty money is earned through various underground activities, like drug, 
weapons and human trafficking. How much illicit crime money in all of its various 
forms is it possible to observe? Baker (2005) estimates the quantity of money to range 
between US$ 1.0 and 1.6 trillion in 2000/2001. This estimate has been adopted by the 
World Bank. Moreover, Baker estimates that half – US$ 500 to 800 billion a year – 
comes out of developing and transitional economies. These are countries that often 
have the weakest legal and administrative structures, the largest criminal gangs of drug 
dealers, and, far too often, economic and political elites who want to take their money 
out of the country by any means possible. 
In Table 1, the global flows from illicit activities worldwide are shown. 
According to Baker, in cross-border illicit financial flows, the proceeds of bribery and 
theft are the smallest quantities, at only perhaps three percent of the global total. 
Generated funds from classical crime activities (No 1-7) account for some 30 to 35 
percent of the global total crime activities. Commercially tax evading money, driven 
in particular by abusive transfer pricing and faked transactions as well as mispricing, 
is by far the largest component at some 60 to 65 percent of the global total crime 
activities. 
                                                 
9 For a detailed analysis see Schneider (2008a, 2008b and 2009), Schneider and Windischbauer (2008), 
Schneider, Dreer and Riegler (2006), and Takats (2007).
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Table 1: Global Flows from Illicit Activities worldwide, years 2000/2001 
Number  Global Flows  Low (US$ bn)  %  High (US$ 
bn) 
% 
1. Drugs  120  11%  200  12.5% 
2. Counterfeit  goods  80  7.5%  120  7.5% 
3.  Counterfeit  currency  3 0.2%  3 0.2% 
4.  Human  trafficking  12 1.1%  15 0.9% 
5. Illegal  arms  trade  6  2.0%  10  0.6% 
6. Smuggling 60  5.6%  100  6.3% 
7. Racketeering  50  4.7%  100  6.3% 
 Crime  subtotal 331 31.2% 549 34.3%
8.  Mispricing  200 18.9%  250 15.6% 
9. Abusive  transfer 
pricing 
300 28.3%  500 31.2% 
10.  Fake  transactions  200 18.9%  250 15.6% 
 Commercial  subtotal 700 66.0% 1,000 62.5%
11.    Corruption 30 2.8%  50 5.1% 
  Grand  Total 1,061 100.0%  1,599 100.0% 
Source: Baker (2005) 
 
 
The next step in the characteristic of money laundering is to make dirty money appear legal 
(compare Walker (1999, 2000, 2004, 2007))
10. There are many methods of money laundering; 
in Table 2 the 12 most common methods according to Unger (2007) and Walker (2007) are 
shown. Choice of method depends on the type of crime activity and on the specific 
institutional arrangements in a country where the criminal money is “earned”? For example, 
in the drug business, method 8 business ownership is used quite often.
11 In the drug business 
and in big cities smaller amounts of cash are earned by drug dealers in a lot of different 
spaces, which they introduce into cash intensive operations such as restaurants which are 
especially well suited for money laundering purposes. In addition another common method is 
the use of cash deposits, the so called smurfing method, or illegal gambling.  
                                                 
10 Step one is the earning and collection of the crime money. 
11 Compare Schneider (2004) and Masciandaro (2004. Page 5 of 16 
Table 2: The Methods of Money Laundering 
1)  Wire transfers 
or electronic 
banking 
The primary tool of money launderers to move funds around in the 
banking system. These moves can conceal the illicit origins of the 
funds or just place the money where the launderers need them. Often 
the funds go through several banks and even different jurisdictions. 
2)  Cash deposits  Money launderers need to deposit cash advances to bank accounts 
prior to wire transfers. Due to anti-money-laundering regulations they 
often ‘structure’ the payments, i.e. break down large to smaller 
amounts. This is also called ‘smurfing’. 
3)  Informal value 
transfer 
systems (IVTS) 
Money launderers need not rely on the banking sector, other transfer 
providers, such as the Hawala or Hindi are readily available to 
undertake fund transfers. These systems consist of shops (mainly 
selling groceries, phone cards or other similar items), which are also 
involved in transfer services. IVTSs enable international fund 
transfers, as these shops are present in several jurisdictions. 
4)  Cash 
smuggling 
Money launderers might mail, Fedex or simply carry cash with them 
from one region to another, or even to different jurisdictions. 
5)  Gambling  Casinos, horse-races and lotteries are ways of legalizing funds. The 
money launderer can buy (for ‘dirty’ cash) winning tickets – or in the 
case of casinos chips – and redeem the tickets or the chips in a ‘clean’ 
bank check. Afterwards, the check can be easily deposited in the 
banking sector. 
6)  Insurance 
policies 
Money launderers purchase single premium insurance (with dirty 
cash), redeem early (and pay some penalty) in order to receive clean 
checks to deposit. Longer term premium payments might make 
laundering even harder to detect. 
7)  Securities  Usually used to facilitate fund transfers, where underlying security 
deals provide cover (and legitimate looking reason) for transfers. 
8)  Business 
ownership 
Money might be laundered through legitimate businesses, where 
laundering funds can be added to legitimate revenues. Cash-intensive 
operations, such as restaurants, are especially well suited for 
laundering. 
9)  Shell 
corporations 
Money launderers might create companies exclusively to provide 
cover for fund moves without legitimate business activities. 
10)  Purchases  Real estate or any durable good purchases can be used to launder 
monies. Typically, the item is bought for cash and resold for clean 
monies, like bank checks. 
11)  Credit card 
advance 
payment 
Money launderers pay money in advance with dirty money, and 
receive clean checks on the balance from the bank 
12)  ATM 
operations 
Banks might allow other firms to operate their ATMs, i.e. to maintain 
and fill them with cash. Money launderers fill ATMs with dirty cash, 
and receive clean checks (for the cash withdrawn) from the bank.  
 Source: Unger (2007: 195-196). 
 
With the help of the MIMIC estimation procedure
12 Schneider (2008a, 2008b) estimates that 
money laundering and/or financial turnover from transnational crime has increased from USD 
                                                 
12 The MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes) procedure is a latent estimation method where the 
dependent variable is unknown. Hence an attempt is made to model the unknown variable (amount of money 
laundering) with the help of causes (various types of crime and their proceeds) and indicators like the 
development of cash). For further explanations see Schneider (2008a, 2008biincluding the appendix). Page 6 of 16 
273 billion (1,33% of the total official GDP) in 1995 to USD 603 billion (or 1,74% of the 
official GDP) in 2006 for 20 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Spain and the United States). On 
a world wide basis in 2006 the IMF estimates USD 600 billion to be laundered coming only 
from the drug (crime) business
13. 
Unger (2007) reproduces the amount of laundered money and its top 20 destination 
countries; Her figures are shown in Table 3 and cover the time span 1997-2005. Here two 
estimates are presented, one by Walker (1999, 2007) and one by the IMF. The Walker figure 
of 2.850 billion USD is much larger than the IMF figure with 1.500 billion USD (both figures 
are for the year 2005). Walker’s figures have been criticized as being to high with that of the 
IMF considered to be more reasonable. Table 3 clearly demonstrates that two thirds of 
worldwide money laundering was sent to the top 20 countries listed. One should realize that 
most of the countries included within the Table are highly developed and have quite sizeable 
legal/official economies. What is also amazing is that there are only a few microstate offshore 
countries (OFCS) and tax heavens among them (Cayman Islands, Vatican City, Bermuda and 
Liechtenstein)
14. The majority of countries that attract money laundering flows are economic 
prepotencies and not some tiny unimportant countries. The United States has the largest 
worldwide share of money laundering of almost 19%, followed by the Cayman Islands 
(4,9%), Russia (4,2%), Italy (3,7%), but also smaller countries like Switzerland (2,1% of 
worldwide money laundering), Liechtenstein (1,7%) and Austria (1,7%) are quite attractive
15. 
If one takes the lower IMF value for Austria, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, roughly 
5.5 % of the total amount is laundered, which comes close to roughly 10% of official GDP of 
the three countries. However, it needs to be emphasized that it is not clear whether this money 
is only laundered in these countries or subsequently stays in these countries; it may well leave 
these countries after the laundering process. In general, Table 3 demonstrates how substantial 
the amount of laundered money is and that two thirds of these funds are concentrated in only 
20 countries.  
Bagella, Busato and Argentiero (2009: 881) use a theoretical two-sector dynamic 
general equilibrium model to measure money laundering for the United States and the EU-15 
macro areas over the sample 2000:01-2007:01 at a quarterly data basis. Their series are 
generated through a fully micro-founded dynamic model, which is appropriately calibrated to 
replicate selected stochastic properties of the two economies. Their model (and the analysis) 
has a short run perspective, and for this reason the paper discusses the stochastic properties of 
the Hodrick-Prescott filtered series. Bagella et al. (2009: 881) produced the following results: 
First the simulations show that money laundering accounts for approximately 19 percent of 
the GDP for the EU-15, while it accounts for 13 percent in the US economy, over the sample 
2000:01-2007:04. Second, the simulated money laundering appears less volatile than the 
corresponding GDP. As regards the EU-15 macro area, the simulated statistics suggest that 
money laundering volatility is one-third of the GDP volatility; for the US economy, the same 
statistics produce a figure of two-fifths. Considering these estimates one must admit that they 
are pretty high.  Comparing these figures with the other ones (from Walker and the IMF) one 
realizes that the range of magnitude is huge and much more research is needed to clarify this. 
 
                                                 
13 For sources see e.g. Zdanowicz (2009), UN (2007), and IMF (2007). 
14 Compare also Masciandaro (2005, 2006), Zdanowicz (2009), Truman and Reuter  (2004), and Walker and 
Unger (2009): 
15 Here are primarily discussed the percentage shares of money laundering or the highly developed countries and 
not the absolute size. Page 7 of 16 
 
Table 3: The Amount of Laundered Money and Top 20 Destinations of Laundered Money, 
Year 2005
1) 





Walker estimate 2.85 
trillion US$ 
Amount in billion US$ 
IMF estimate of 1.5 
trillion worldwide 
Amount in billion US$ 
1 United  States  18.9%  538,145  283,500 
2 Cayman  Islands  4.9%  138,329  73,500 
3 Russia  4.2%  120,493  63,000 
4 Italy  3.7%  105,688  55,500 
5 China  3.3%  94,726  49,500 
6 Romania  3.1%  89,595  46,500 
7 Canada  3.0%  85,444  45,000 
8 Vatican  City  2.8%  80,596  42,000 
9 Luxembourg  2.8%  78,468  42,000 
10 France  2.4%  68,471  36,000 
11 Bahamas  2.3%  66,398  34,500 
12 Germany  2.2%  61,315  33,000 
13 Switzerland  2.1%  58,993  31,500 
14 Bermuda  1.9%  52,887  28,500 
15 Netherlands  1.7%  49,591  25,500 
16 Liechtenstein  1.7%  48,949  25,500 
17 Austria  1.7%  48,376  25,500 
18 Hong  Kong  1.6%  44,519  24,000 
19 United  Kingdom  1.6%  44,478  24,000 
20 Spain  1.2%  35,461  18,000 
 SUM  67.1%  1,910,922  1,006,500 
1) Source Unger (2007: 80) 
2) Based on the average of the Walker and IMF estimates 
 
From a global perspective for 2000, the IMF (2003, 2001) as well as the World Bank (2001) 
estimate that 2-4% of the world gross domestic product (GDP) stem from illicit (criminal) 
sources. Agarwal and Agarwal (2006) estimate from economic intelligence units that global 
money laundering amounts to more than 2.0 to 2.5 trillion US$ annually or about 5-6% of 
World GDP in 2006 (4.444 trillion US$ in 2006)
16 to be contrasted against an observed figure 
of US$ 500 billion to one trillion in 2004 from the same authors (Agarwal and Agarwal 
(2004)). Recent IMF estimates on money laundering by drug traffickers who “infiltrate” the 
proceeds gained through the selling of drugs into the legitimate financial market, amount to 
600 billion US$ annually. The IDB (2004) reaches the conclusion that for Latin America a 
rough estimate appears to be somewhere between 2.5 and 6.3 % of annual GDP of Latin 
American countries. 
In their latest study Walker and Unger (2009, page 821) again undertake an attempt to 
measure global money laundering and/or the proceeds from transnational crime that are 
pumped through the financial system worldwide. They criticize methods such as case studies, 
proxy variables, or models for measuring the crime economy, arguing that they all tend to 
under- or overestimate money laundering. They present a model which makes it possible to 
estimate the flows of illicit funds from and to each jurisdiction in the world and worldwide. 
This “Walker Model” was first developed in 1994, and was recently updated. The authors 
                                                 
16 Again the figures by Agarwal and Agarwal seem implausible high; one can also question the scientific basis. Page 8 of 16 
show that it belongs to the group of gravity models which have recently become popular in 
international trade theory
17. The authors demonstrate that the original Walker Model estimates 
are compatible with recent findings on money laundering. Once the scale of money 
laundering is known, its macroeconomic effects and the impact of crime prevention, 
regulation and law enforcement effects on money laundering and transnational crime can also 
be measured. Walker and Unger (2009: 849-850) conclude that their model still seems to be 
the most reliable and robust method to estimate global money laundering, and thereby the 
important effects of transnational crime on economic, social and political institutions. Rightly 
they argue that the attractiveness of the distance indicator in the Walker model is a first 
approximation, but is still quite ad hoc. A better micro-foundation for the Walker Model will 
be needed in the future. A micro foundation means that, the behavior of money launderers is 
analyzed, and in particular what makes them send their money to a specific country. Hence, 
Walker and Unger (2009, p. 850) argue that an economics of crime micro-foundation for the 
Walker Model would mean that, similarly to international trade theory, behavioral 
assumptions about money launderers have to be made. Their gravity model must be the 
(reduced form) outcome of their rational calculus of sending their money to a certain country 
and potentially making large profits. 
 
This part clearly shows how difficult it is to get reliable estimates of the size and development 
of the turnover of transnational crime and of the part which is laundered then. To give an 
overall scientific evaluation of the reliability of the discussed figures is at the current stage of 
research (Dec. 2010) not possible, as we do not have enough knowledge about this difficult 
area. On can make plausibility checks, as I did it, but this is all what can be done so far. 
 
2.3 The Sources of Transnational Crime Financing 
Obviously the financial sources of transnational crime come from all crime activities in which 
the transnational crime organizations are engaged. The most important of which are analyzed 
below.  
 
(1) Drug Trafficking 
According to Yepes (2008) in May 2002 a report called “Global Overview of Narcotics-
Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist and Transnational Crime Groups”
18 was launched, 
prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress and the US Department 
of Defense. The report examined connections between terrorist groups and narcotics 
trafficking in the following regions of Latin America: Triborder Region (Argentina, Brazil, 
and Paraguay), Colombia, and Peru; in the Middle East: Lebanon, in Southern Europe 
(Albania and Macedonia); in Central Asia: Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and in 
East Asia: The Philippines. In this respect the report shows clear evidence in relation to drugs 
and financing and the connection between terrorist and transnational crime organizations
19. 
 
(2) Oil Smuggling 
According to Johnson (2001) and Napoleoni (2005) another crime business is oil smuggling, 
where terror, criminal, and legitimate economies interact. Countries, where oil smuggling is a 
significant problem are Thailand, China, Russia, Cambodia, Iran and Tanzania. In all these 
countries oil smuggling ”creates” significant profits, a substantial portion of which enters the 
                                                 
17 Gravity models try to explain that trade flows in and out of big centres; hence the bigger / larger the gravity 
centre the more trade it has. 
18 See http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf 
19 Compare also FATF (2005), Masciandaro (2004) and Zdanowicz (2009), who provide empirical evidence for 
this. Page 9 of 16 
laundering cycle. Oil smuggling is also related to arms trade according to Johnson (2001) and 
Napoleoni (2005).  
 
(3) Arms / Diamonds Trafficking 
According to Levi and Gilmore (2002), Schneider (2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2009) and Yepes 
(2008) in addition to drugs, arms trafficking, as well as illegal diamonds trade are some of the 
most important sources of funding of transnational crime groups. The illicit arms trade 
demonstrates how comparatively easy it is to obtain false documentation accompanying arms 
shipments, especially end-user certificates. Inconsistent documentation requirements between 
states, and inefficient control in customs and port authorities in many states, have created an 
environment in which the illicit arms trade does not need to rely entirely on criminal activities 
for example: 
(1) When a state is involved in supplying arms to an embargoed state, payments or even a 
barter exchange often come in the form of commercial payments, such as “oil for arms” 
deals to avoid bank involvement. 
(2) When an arms broker supplies weapons to an embargoed state, banks are often used 
because shipments are usually paid for in the form of letters of credit by the direct transfer 
of hard-currency funds. In this case, money laundering becomes an important factor to 
ensure that the final arms destination is disguised. It is at this point that offshore banks 
play an important role because their facilities can ensure that any deposit or transfer is 
routed via several intermediary institutions; and deposits or transfers can be conducted in 
the name of a series of shell companies. Both of these techniques are used to hide the 
financial trail behind multiple administrative layers.   
(3) In situations where access to normal banking channels is very difficult (for example, as 
with most non-state actors), the financing of arms deals often takes a different form, most 
often through commodity exchanges. According to Smillie et al. (2000), illicit arms 
transfers to Liberia and Sierra Leone were often financed with diamonds and timber 
concessions. 
 
3. The Infiltration of the legal Economic System and of the Informal Money 
Banking (Hawala) System by Transnational Crime Organizations 
Obviously transnational crime organizations prefer to use an informal banking system, in 
order to make it more difficult for the state authorities to detect transactions. The most famous 
and oldest informal banking system is the Hawala banking system, which will be analyzed in 
part 3.2 after a short introduction regarding the different kinds of infiltration by crime 
organizations. 
 
3.1 The Infiltration of Legal the Economic System 
In Figure 1 the various channels of infiltration used by the transnational crime groups are 
summarized. Figure 1 concentrates on the use of financial resources and clearly demonstrates 
that the financial means / flows stand on five pillars ranking from legal investments to 
classical criminal activities.  Page 10 of 16 
 
Figure 3.1: Infiltration of the Legal Economy by Transnational Crime  
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Source: Yepes (2008: 56) and author’s own remarks. 
 
3.2 The Informal Money Banking (Hawala) System 
During the 1990s, international concern grew over the “underground banking” and its abuse 
by serious offenders. Some academic works by Williams (2007), Savona (1997) and El-
Quorchi (2003) have explained how informal systems operate, including their risks. The 
Informal Value Transfers Systems (IVTS) changes from region to region (also referred to as 
Hawala or door-to-door). Some scholars (Williams, 2007; El-Quorchi, 2003) argue that 
Hawala is vulnerable to criminal abuse, and like the other financial institutions, there is 
evidence that money derived from drug trafficking, illegal arms sales, body part trade, 
corruption, tax evasion, and all kinds of fraud having been moved through Hawala networks.  
Hawala banking still takes place and some authors provide literature (Passas (2005) 
and van de Bunt (2007)) about the Hawala banking system, where these authors point to the 
need for a regulation of the Hawala banking system. As argued, another way to transfer 
criminal financial flows is the Hawala banking. According to van de Bunt (2007), Hawala 
bankers
20 are financial service providers who carry out financial transactions without a license 
and therefore without government control
21. They accept cash, cheques or other valuable 
goods (diamonds, gold) at one location and pay a corresponding sum in cash or other 
remuneration at another location. Unlike official banks, Hawala bankers disregard the legal 
                                                 
20 Several traditional terms, like Hundi (India) and Fei-ch’ein (China) remind one of the fact that hawala banking 
came up independently in different parts of the world. At present, a range of other terms is used to refer to the 
same phenomenon, such as ‘informal banking’, ‘underground banking’, ‘ethnic banking’ or ‘informal value 
transfer system’. 
21 This clearly means that Hawala banking system is a highly unregulated and informal system. Compare 
Schneider (2010) and Van de Bunt (2007). Page 11 of 16 
obligations concerning the identification of clients, record keeping, and the disclosure of 
unusual transactions, to which these official financial institutions are subject.  
To re-emphasize the point: through this system that forms an integral part of the legal 
(formal) and informal market economy in a number of countries, Hawala bankers ensure the 
transfer of money without having to move it physically or electronically. When a payment 
needs to be made overseas, the underground banker will get in touch with a courier (or more 
recently using email, fax or phone) in that country informing him of the details of the 
payment. If the recipient of the payment wishes to personally obtain the money, a code 
referring to the underground banker in the country of payment is given to the recipient. Such a 
system is almost untraceable since it leaves little, if any, paper trail. Transaction records are 
kept only until the money is delivered, at which time they are destroyed. Even when there is a 
paper or electronic record of the transaction it is often in dialects and languages that serve as a 
de facto encryption system.  
According to Fischer (2002: 17), the annual turnover
22 of the Hawala banking system 
in the early seventies was already 60 billion USD in the Arabic countries: For example, seven 
million foreign laborers in Saudi Arabia, who are sending home 43 billion USD a year, make 
substantial use of the “ethnic” Hawala system. Fletcher and Baldrin (2002, p. 119) estimate 
with regard to Pakistan that 2.5 billion USD flow in the country in remittances via the Hawala 
system in 2001; the amount of money in India´s Hindi system was 50 billion USD in 1971. 
Despite the growing competition by formal remittance services, the use of Hawala banking 
has probably not declined. According to a recent estimate by the IMF (2005), (especially 
Asian) migrants transfer 100 billion dollars per annum to family members and relations in 
their country of origin through the official financial system. In addition, a similar amount of 
money is transferred in the form of goods and cash through the Hawala bankers. 
According to van de Bunt (2007), there are at least two different perspectives on 
Hawala banking. From the first point of view, Hawala banking is regarded as a centuries-old 
institution, which has not yet outlived its usefulness. Low-income workers and migrant 
workers in particular, supposedly put more trust in Hawala bankers than in formal banks. This 
viewpoint emphasizes the problem associated with subjecting Hawala banking to the same 
rules as formal banks. Regulation either through registration or licensing is seen as ineffective 
because it will simply push the system further into the underground, further complicating the 
already problematic task of controlling Hawala transactions (Razavy, 2005: 292; Perkel, 
2004: 210-211). Hence, Hawala banking might be the closest thing of free market banking, 
without government regulation that has functioned well for centuries. One should clearly 
emphasize these advantages of Hawala banking when criticizing it. From the opposite point of 
view, van de Bunt (2007) argues that Hawala banking is described as ‘underground banking’, 
a system that flies under the radar of modern supervision of financial transactions. 
Underground banking can be considered a threat to the effectiveness of anti-money 
laundering measures and the fight against terrorist financing. To prevent underground bankers 
from becoming a safe haven for criminals and terrorists, they should be subject to the standard 







                                                 
22 Mostly these are legal payments and of course can include some illegal payments and it is unclear whether the 
Hawala banker knows this. 
23 Compare also Richard (2005) and Rider (2004). This is a general claim in order to be on the safe side. 
However, to the author´s knowledge there is no clear empirical evidence that the Hawala banking system has 
been infiltrated by the transnational and/or organized crime organizations. Page 12 of 16 
3.3 The Principal Sources of Organized Crime Financing 
The sources of organized crime financing which are channeled through formal and informal 
systems come from a variety of origins, some criminal, some not. As discussed in Schneider 
(2008b) and (2010) the most important are:  
(1) International and domestic activities: e.g. : black mail, corruption and all the crime related 
activities; 
(2) diaspora-migrant communities: contributions for protection; 
(3) high level transnational crime: fraud, illegal production and smuggling of drugs, 
kidnapping, armed robbery, trafficking in human beings; and  
(4) investments and legitimate business: money is used to acquire legal enterprises. 
 
 
4.  Summary and Conclusions  
In this chapter an attempt is made to review the literature of the finances of transnational 
crime with a focus on estimations of the volume of the finances of transnational crime. The 
chapter reaches the following two findings: 
First, the necessity of money laundering is obvious as a great number of illegal (criminal) 
transactions are cash based. Hence, this amount of cash from criminal activities must be 
laundered in order to have some “legal” profit, to undertake investment or consumption in the 
legal world. Second, to arrive at an estimate of the extent and development of the amount of 
the financial means of transnational crime over time is even more difficult
24. This paper 
collects some findings and Schneider (2008b; 2010)) show that money laundering from 
transnational crime has increased from 273 billion USD (or 1,33% of official GDP) in 1995 to 
603 billion USD (or 1,74% of official GDP) in 2006 for 20 OECD countries (Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Great Britain, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, Spain and 
the United States). On a worldwide bases in 2006, 600 billion USD are estimated to be 
laundered coming only from the total drug (crime) business. These figures are very 
preliminary with a quite large margin of error, but give a clear indication how important 
money laundering and the turnover of transnational crime nowadays is.  
From these preliminary results I draw three conclusions: 
(1) The revenues of transnational crime are scientifically extremely difficult to tackle. It’s 
defined differently in almost every country, the measures taken against it are different and 
vary from country to country and it is not so all clear what money laundering from the 
revenues of transnational crime really is.
25 
(2) To fight against transnational crime is also extremely difficult, as there are no efficient 
and powerful international organizations which can effectively fight against transnational 
crime
26. 
(3) Hence, this paper should be seen as a first start/attempt in order to shed some light on the 






                                                 
24 All estimated figures have a large error, the estimation procedures are very difficult to use. Hence the 
published figures should be interpreted with great care. Compare also conclusion1. 
25 The definition of money laundering considerably varies from country to country, also there are no 
international organized and harmonized effects to fight money laundering with the result that little has been done 
so far. 
26 Some fist attempts have been made, like the FATF, or some suborganizations in the U.N. Page 13 of 16 
5. Appendix: The Amount of Financial Flows of Transnational Crime 
Organizations – the Estimation Procedure (Latent Estimator 
MIMIC Approach) 
As the size of financial flows of the transnational crime organizations is an unknown (hidden) 
figure, a latent estimator approach using a MIMIC (i.e. multiple indicators, multiple causes 
estimation) procedure is applied. This method has quite successfully been used to estimate the 
size of the shadow economy and is now briefly described.
27) This estimation procedure is 
called the “model approach” which explicitly considers the multiple causes of as well as 
multiple indicators of the hidden variable. The method is based on the statistical theory of 
unobserved variables, which consider multiple causes and multiple indicators of the 
phenomenon (size of the shadow economy, size of the financial flow of (transnational crime 
organizations). A factor-analytic approach is used to measure the hidden economy (here size 
of financial flows of transnational crime organizations) as an unobserved variable over time. 
The unknown coefficients are estimated in a set of structural equations within which the 
“unobserved” variable cannot be measured directly. The MIMIC (multiple-indicators 
multiple-causes) model consists in general of two parts; the measurement model links the 
unobserved variables to observed indicators. The structural equations model specifies causal 
relationships among the unobserved variables. In this case, there is one unobserved variable, 
the size of the financial flows of transnational crime organizations. It is assumed to be 
influenced by a set of indicators for these financial flows, thus capturing the structural 
dependence of these financial flows on variables that may be useful in predicting its 
movement and size. The interaction over time between the causes Zit (i = 1, 2, ..., k), the size 
of these financial flows Xt, and the indicators Yjt (j = 1, 2, ..., p) is shown in Figure A1.  
 
Figure A1: Development of the shadow economy (size of financial flows of transnational 


















Source: Prof. Dr. Friedrich Schneider 
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